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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a conceptual framework for understanding the consequences of the widespread
adoption of "race-neutral alternatives" to conventional racial affirmative action policies in college
admissions. A simple model of applicant competition with endogenous effort is utilized to show that,
in comparison to color-conscious affirmative action, these color-blind alternatives can significantly
lower the efficiency of the student selection process in equilibrium. We examine data on
matriculates at several selective colleges and universities to estimate the magnitudes involved. It is
shown that the short-run efficiency losses of implementing color-blind affirmative action (in our
sample) are four to five times as high as color-conscious affirmative action.
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yuret@bu.edu“Implementing race-neutral programs will help educational institutions minimize lit-
igation risks they currently face... If we are persistent in implementing race-neutral
approaches, the end result will be to fulﬁll the great words of Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr., who dreamed of the day that all children will be judged by the content of their
character and not the color of their skin.”
– U.S. Department of Education: Race-Neutral Alternatives in Postsecondary Educa-
tion: Innovative Approaches to Diversity, Washington, DC., March 2003, pp. 7, 40
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The legal and political climate has shifted dramatically over the last decade on the issue of racial
aﬃrmative action. Accordingly, a number of institutions have begun to reformulate their policies
— particularly in higher education. The states of Texas and Florida now guarantee admission to
their public university systems for all in-state high school students graduating in the top ten and
twenty percent, respectively, of their senior classes.1 In the wake of Proposition 209 — a 1996 ballot
initiative that banned racial aﬃrmative action in California — public higher education oﬃcials there
have substantially revised admissions practices.2 Some private institutions have even decided to no
1In 1996, the state of Texas was ordered by a federal court to eliminate all race-conscious aﬃrmative action
in university admissions decisions. [See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).] The Texas legislature
responded to Hopwood by passing House Bill 588, which guarantees Texas public high school students who graduate
in the top 10% of their class admission to any Texas public college or university.
In February 2000, at the request of Governor Bush, the Florida State Board of Education banned consideration of
race in admissions decisions for the state’s higher education institutions. Florida’s percentage plan, the Talented 20
program, took eﬀect in August 2000. Under this plan, students who graduate from Florida’s public high schools in
the top 20% of their class, complete nineteen speciﬁc academic credits, and take an SAT or ACT test are guaranteed
admission to one of eleven state universities, although not necessarily admission to the institution of the student’s
choice.
2The so-called “Eligibility in the Local Context” policy was implemented in California in the Fall of 2001. This
program guarantees that the top 4% of each high school graduating class in the state will be admitted to one campus
in the university system. For students admitted in the Fall of 2002, the UC system implemented a “comprehensive
review” policy, which permits each campus to set admissions standards based on ten academic and four non-academic
supplemental criteria, two of which may relate to socioeconomic status.
2longer require that applicants submit standardized test scores.3 A number of scholars and policy
analysts have urged elite colleges and universities to rely more on the socioeconomic background
and other non-racial, non-academic characteristics of prospective students when assessing their
applications.4
Many justiﬁcations can be oﬀered for these changes in admissions practice, but a primary factor
would seem to be the desire to enhance racial diversity amongst the admitted without recourse to
the use of explicit racial preferences. For this reason, we call these types of policies “color-blind
aﬃrmative action,” in contrast to the more conventional, “color-sighted”aﬃrmative action policies.
This paper develops a simple model and explores some policy simulation exercises in order to
study the economic implications of this emergent practice. We are particularly concerned with the
question of whether, and the extent to which, a widespread shift toward color-blind aﬃrmative
action might be expected to impair the eﬃciency of resource allocation in higher education. The
answer to this question is of considerable importance for public policy.5
It is important to understand that when one insists on color-blindness one does not thereby
preclude the introduction of policies that favor a particular racial group. This is the point being
made by the US Department of Education in the quotation above (advocating that conventional
aﬃrmative action be abandoned in favor of so-called “race-neutral programs.”) Under color-sighted
aﬃrmative action, selectors give an explicit preference to individual applicants from some targeted
racial group. A commitment to color-blindness prohibits such behavior. Even so, group-preferential
goals can still be pursued tacitly under color-blindness, via policies that are implementable in a
group-neutral manner. Speciﬁcally, by exploiting their knowledge of diﬀerences between the race-
3Mount Holyoke College, for example, has abrogated that requirement, while committing itself to admit some of
the applicants who do not submit scores.
4Richard Kahlenberg (1996) is perhaps the most prominent advocate of so-called class-based aﬃrmative action
policies.
5It will be obvious in what follows that the ideas studied in this paper are of quite general relevance. “Color-
blind aﬃrmative action” arises in many areas of public policy having nothing to do with enhancing racial diversity.
For example, a powerful legislator may want to inﬂuence the formula specifying how some public beneﬁtw i l lb e
distributed among juridisctions, with an eye toward beneﬁting his own constituency without appearing to be doing
so. More generally, category-blind preferential policies can be used to pursue many group-redistributive goals (among
population segments deﬁned in terms of age, religous belief, gender, health status, region, nationality, and so forth),
when decision-makers wish to avoid the appearance of playing favorites. We elaborate on this point in the Conclusion.
3conditioned distributions of non-racial traits in the applicant population, selectors can favor a tar-
geted racial group by over-emphasizing those non-racial productivity correlates that are relatively
more likely to be found among members of that group.6
We investigate this problem by developing an analytical apparatus in light of which all of the
aforementioned color-blind practices — percentage plans, voluntary test score submission, increased
relative weight on non-test score criteria, preferential admission based on socioeconomic status —
as well as conventional aﬃrmative action policies, may be viewed within a uniﬁed framework. The
central idea conceives of an abstract admissions policy function for a college or university. Given
the applicant pool, this function maps each applicant’s “proﬁle” into a probability of admitting
that applicant. An applicant’s proﬁle is merely a list of that applicant’s “score” along a number
of dimensions, not all of which need be directly related to academic achievement. In general, an
applicant’s chance of admission can be made to depend upon a host of factors. Conventional aca-
demic variables — test performance, grades in high school, recommendation letters, interview results
— can be supplemented with information about an applicant’s social background, life experience,
geographic region of origin, extra-curricular interests, and the like. We think of the speciﬁcv a r i -
ables used in an admissions policy function, and the weights given to them, as being chosen by the
college or university in order to meet its admissions objectives. An admissions policy function is
said to be “color-blind” (or, equivalently, “race-blind”) if, other things being equal, the probability
of admission that gets assigned to a proﬁle does not depend upon an applicant’s race.
This paper derives two new insights from this general approach: First, by allowing (in our
simulation exercises) for colleges to make their admissions decisions based on a vector of academic
and non-academic applicant traits, we can deduce how a ban on color-sighted aﬃrmative action
might lower selection eﬃciency in the short-run, and alter the relative weights given to various
factors (grades vs. test scores vs. socioeconomic background, for instance) in the selection process.
Secondly, by studying (in our theoretical model) the ways in which color-blind policies distort
applicants’ incentives to acquire traits valued by selectors in equilibrium, we call attention to an
additional loss in eﬃciency that may occur over the longer-run under these policies.
6Obviously, introducing a purely random element to the selection process can also raise the yield from any group
that is statistically underrepresented in the pool of admittees. This point is stressed by Chan and Eyster (2003).
However, one important contribution of this paper is to show that the options available to selectors for engaging in
color-blind aﬃrmative action are much broader that the simple use of randomization in the selection process.
4There are two distinct ways in which color-blind aﬃrmative action is inherently ineﬃcient. First,
in the short run, when the distribution of traits in the applicant pool may be taken as given, all
aﬃrmative action policies yield lower expected performance among the selected than does Laissez-
faire. This is due to the fact that, under Laissez-faire (i.e., in the absence of any aﬃrmative action
policy), every admitted applicant is anticipated to perform better than any rejected applicant, which
by deﬁnition cannot be true under any form of aﬃrmative action. But, color-blind aﬃrmative action
is particularly ineﬃcient in the short run, in the sense that its performance is always dominated by
the best color-sighted aﬃrmative action policy calibrated to achieve the same group representation
goal. This is so because the non-racial factors which best promote selection from a targeted group
are necessarily diﬀerent from the non-racial factors which best predict post-selection academic
performance — otherwise, some form of aﬃrmative action would not be needed in the ﬁrst place.
Secondly, color-blind aﬃrmative action is likely to be ineﬃcient over the longer run as well, when
one considers how the distribution of traits presented by applicants will shift in response to the
incentives created by colleges’ admissions policies. Color-blind policies work by biasing the weights
placed on non-racial traits in the admissions policy function so as to exploit the fact that some traits
are relatively more likely to be found among the members of a preferred racial group. So, color-
blind policies necessarily create a situation where the relative importance of traits for enhancing
an applicant’s prospects of being admitted diverges from the relative signiﬁcance of those traits
for enhancing an applicant’s post-admissions performance. We show below that this is never the
case under optimal color-sighted policy. Thus, to the extent that color-blind preferential policies
distort applicants’ decisions to acquire performance-enhancing traits prior to entering the selection
competition, additional ineﬃciencies will emerge. We explore this possibility in our theoretical
analysis.
Much has been written on the pros and cons of aﬃrmative action, especially in the labor
market.7 However, until quite recently there had been little attention given in either the theoretical
or empirical literatures to the problem of resource allocation ineﬃciencies due to aﬃrmative action
in higher education.8 Two recent contributions warrant to be mentioned. Chan and Eyster (2003)
7Coate and Loury (1993) develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the incentive eﬀects of aﬃrmative action
in the labor market. Holzer and Neumark (2000) is a comprehensive and insightful review of the theoretical and
empirical literatures on aﬃrmative action.
8Datcher Loury and Garman (1993) is an exception. That paper argues empirically that racial preferences in
5have independently made one of the observations which we stress here — namely, that a ban on
aﬃrmative action could induce colleges to use non-racially preferential means to pursue their racial
diversity ends, with potentially detrimental consequences for the eﬃciency of student selection.
They study a constrained-optimal admissions problem for a college that values both student quality
and racial diversity, that can rank students based on a one-dimensional measure of student ability,
but that is enjoined from using racial preferences. Similar to our theoretical ﬁndings presented
below, Chan and Eyster conclude that the second-best optimal admissions policy generally involves
randomization, with the net result being that a ban on color-sighted aﬃrmative action could end-up
lowering the average quality of the college’s admitted class. However, they are unable to address
long-run eﬃciency issues in a comprehensive manner because, unlike in the present study, their
model treats applicant characteristics as exogenous and one dimensional.
In another recent paper, Epple, Romano and Sieg (2003) have also taken note of the fact that
a prohibition on explicit aﬃrmative action can be expected to alter a college’s use of non-racial
information in the admissions process. Their numerically simulated model complements ours by
focusing on the supply side of the higher education market. They introduce a framework where
colleges, which diﬀer in their attractiveness to applicants, compete with one another for the most
desirable students. They are thus able to address the important question (which we here ignore)
of how the distribution of students across a quality-hierarchy of colleges would be aﬀected by a
ban on explicit racial preferences. However they also take the distribution of applicant traits to be
exogenous, so their analysis focuses on a diﬀerent set of issue than those explored below.
The next two sections of this paper illustrate the workings of color-blind aﬃrmative action
by analyzing hypothetical college admissions problems, using data from the College and Beyond
Survey (described in Bowen and Bok, 1998.) First, we introduce a formal analytical framework,
show how the optimal color-blind aﬃrmative action policy can be represented as the solution to
a simple linear programming problem, and derive formulas for the optimal admissions policies in
this setting. Then we report the numerical results of our policy simulation exercises, and examine
how color-blind aﬃrmative action would alter the relative weights given to non-racial traits in a
college admissions may induce an ineﬃcient assignment of minority students to institutions (diﬀerentiated by their
degree of selectivity). However, the evidence on this question is mixed. Using diﬀerent data, Kane (1998) ﬁnds no
support for the hypothesis of a detrimental mismatch for minorty students due to (color-sighted) aﬃrmative action
in college admissions.
6college’s admissions formula. We ﬁnd that, compared to an optimal color-sighted selection formula,
the optimal color-blind policy with the same representation goal puts less weight on academic
factors and more weight on social background factors. These policy exercises also allow us to
estimate the magnitude of the aforementioned short-run eﬃciency losses associated with color-
blind aﬃrmative action. We ﬁnd that color-blind policies are signiﬁcantly less eﬀective at screening
for the better academic prospects than are color-sighted policies calibrated to achieve the same
racial representation target.9
Following this discussion of our simulation exercises, we present a simple theoretical model
intended to illustrate the detrimental incentive eﬀects of color-blind policies over the longer run. In
the model, prior to applying for admission but anticipating the policies that colleges will employ,
students make a binary eﬀort decision that aﬀects the distribution of their academic qualiﬁcation.
We show that, as the colleges’ representation target approaches population parity, in the unique
equilibrium of the model under color-blind aﬃrmative action the fraction of students who choose
high eﬀort approaches zero. In contrast, under color-sighted aﬃrmative action a goal of population
parity can be achieved in equilibrium without vitiating students’ incentives to choose high eﬀort.
This stark result graphically illustrates the potential for signiﬁcant eﬃciency losses over the longer
run due to reliance on color-blind policies. This paper can therefore be viewed as a theoretical and
empirical evaluation of the limits of “race-neutral approaches” such as those advocated by the U.S.
Department of Education in the passage quoted above. Our principle conclusion is that relying
solely on “race-neutral approaches” to achieve greater racial diversity in higher education runs the
risk of serious, unintended negative consequences.10
9The estimates reported here constitute a lower bound on the relative ineﬃciency of color-blind aﬃrmative action,
since we are not able with the data at hand to assess quantitatively the eﬃciency losses that may arise due to the
detrimental incentive eﬀects of these policies.
10For a more extended, critical discussion of these race neutral approaches — in the context of a speciﬁcl e g a l
dispute over the constitutionality of racial aﬃrmative action at public universities — see the amicus curiae brief ﬁled
with the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Grutter v. Bollinger involving the University of Michigan Law School,
Loury et al. (2003).
We realize, of course, that eﬃciency is not the only concern when assessing the desirability or the legality of
alternative aﬃrmative action policies. However, under the current Supreme Court’s standards of legal scrutiny, a
racial preference can be permitted if it constitutes a “narrowly tailored” means of furthering a “compelling state
interest.” Thus, once the goal of enhanced racial diversity in college admissions is acknowledged to be a compelling
72 Implementing Color-Blind Aﬃrmative Action
To ﬁx ideas, consider a concrete example of how color-blind aﬃrmative action might work: Sup-
pose initially that a college wants to admit a certain fraction of its applicants while maximizing
the expected performance of those admitted. Let expected performance be a linear function of
standardized test scores and of high school grades.11 It is clear, then, that this college should adopt
the policy of admitting only those applicants whose expected performance exceeds some threshold,
where this threshold has the property that the fraction of applicants exceeding it just equals the
fraction the college desires to admit. In eﬀect, this means that the “weight” the college gives to
grades relative to test scores in its admissions policy function should equal the ratio of the respective
partial correlations of these variables with post-admissions performance. Now, suppose the college
believes that following this threshold policy would lead to “too few” members of some racial group
being admitted. Imagine that the college wants to obtain a greater degree of racial diversity while
continuing to be race-blind in its treatment of individual applicants. Finally, suppose the college
knows that among its applicants the distributions of grades within racial groups are much more
similar to each other than are the corresponding distributions of test scores. Then the representa-
tion of the racial group with relatively lower (higher) test scores could be enhanced by setting the
weight given to grades relative to test scores in the admissions policy function above (below) the
level warranted by the relative correlations of these variables with post-admissions performance.
To introduce such a change in admissions policy — as the states of Texas, Florida and California
have, in fact, now done — would be to engage in the practice of color-blind aﬃrmative action.
one, eﬃciency considerations become relevant to the legal determination of whether a given policy has been narrowly
tailored to advance that purpose. A grossly ineﬃcient policy, relative to some feasible alternative that achieves the
same racial representation goal, is not a narrowly tailored one. See Ayers (1996), and the related discussion in Loury
et al. (2003).
11We focus in the present example on two variables likely to enter any college’s admissions policy function without













Figure 1: Relative Weight on Test Scores and Grades
Figure 1 captures the intuition at work here. The line segment LF represents a college’s optimal
admissions frontier under a policy of no aﬃrmative action (call this Laissez-faire). Applicants above
the line are admitted with probability one, while those falling below the line are admitted with
probability zero. The line segment CB represents the same college’s admission frontier under a
policy of color-blind aﬃrmative action. The CB frontier is steeper than the LF frontier because we
have supposed that the distributions of grades within racial groups are more nearly equally to each
other than are the distributions of test scores. The shaded area marked A in the ﬁgure depicts
the set of applicants (with high test scores and low grades) who are rejected under CB, but who
would have been admitted under LF. And, the area marked B shows the set of applicants (with
high grades and low test scores) who are admitted under CB, but would have been rejected under
Laissez-faire. Because the conditional probability that an applicant belongs to the targeted racial
group is greater, given that the application falls in area B, than it is given that the application falls
in area A, this college can enhance racial diversity in a race-blind manner by raising the weight it
gives to grades relative to test scores when evaluating all applicants.12
12Note that this enhanced racial diversity is achieved at the cost of admitting a lower performing class on average,
since the expected performance of every applicant in B is lower than that of any applicant in A.
Furthermore, suppose a college were to make reporting test scores optional for its applicants, while committing
itself to admitting a certain fraction of its incoming class from the set of students electing not to submit scores
(as Mount Holyoke College has, in fact, recently done.) In light of the incentives thereby created for applicants to
9A. A Formal Framework
We now extend and formalize this example, by way of developing our simulated policy analysis
in this paper. First we introduce some notation. Imagine that a college is to select an incoming
class from a ﬁnite set of applicants. Let c denote the proportion of applicants to whom admission
can be oﬀered, 0 <c<1,a n dl e tr denote the target admissions rate for a disadvantaged minority
group (relative to the size of the applicant pool). Let I be the set of all applicants, and take i ∈ I
to index a particular individual.
Suppose that each applicant belongs to one of two racial groups, and let Ri ∈ {1,2} denote
the racial group membership of applicant i. Each application reports values for a bundle of non-
racial traits (grades, social background factors, test scores and the like). Let J denote the set of
non-racial traits, with speciﬁc traits indexed by j ∈ J. Then, the ith student’s application can
be represented by the vector (Ri;xi), where xi ≡ (x
j
i)j∈J ,a n dw h e r ex
j
i is the value which the
application of student i reports for non-racial trait j. Moreover, the college’s entire applicant pool
can be represented by the (large) array X = {(Ri;xi)i∈I}.
Now, in general, an admission policy for the college in this setting associates with every applicant
pool an array of probabilities specifying the chance that each applicant in the pool will be admitted.
Let Ai be the probability of admitting applicant i, 0 ≤ Ai ≤ 1. Then the college’s admissions
problem is to associate with each applicant pool, X, a vector of admission probabilities, A(X)=
(Ai)i∈I , so as to maximize the expected academic performance of the admitted class, subject to
its capacity and racial representation constraints.
Let pi be the college’s expectation of the academic performance of applicant i. We assume that
this expectation can be expressed as a linear function of the applicant’s non-racial traits. Thus:






for some vector of coeﬃcients β. In addition, to the extent that the non-racial traits are distributed
diﬀerently within the racial groups, a color-blind college could use this fact to estimate the racial
group membership of any applicant presenting a particular vector of non-racial traits. Again,
selectively report their test scores, this too would be a color-blind policy that, although not explicitly preferential to
any racial group, could be expected to result in more students from low-scoring groups being admitted.
10adopting a linear speciﬁcation of this relationship, we assume that:






for some vector of coeﬃcients, γ.13
We will be considering the implications of three distinct policy regimes: Laissez-faire (LF); color-










Aipi}, subject to the following three constraints:
(i) Ai ∈ [0,1],i∈ I,( i i ) 1
|I|{
P
i∈I Ai} ≤ c, (iii) 1
|I|{
P
i∈I Airi} ≥ r.
The maximand above is the anticipated average performance of the admitted class. Constraint
(i) restrict the Ai to being probabilities; (ii) is the capacity constraint, and (iii) is the aﬃrmative
action representation constraint. In light of the discussion to this point, it should be clear that a
college’s optimal CB admissions policy must solve this linear programming problem. An optimal
LF policy solves the same problem, but without constraint (iii). And, an optimal CS policy can be
derived by ﬁrst partitioning the applicant pool by race, and then solving parallel linear programs
for each group, analogous to the LF version of the program above, but with the group-speciﬁc
capacity constraints r2 = r
1−λ for group 2, and r1 = c−r
λ for group 1.
Solutions for the optimization problems implied by the three policy regimes are easily derived.
Under the LF regime, one simply orders applicants by their expected performance, admitting the
proportion c with the higher values of pi. That is, for some number, µ (the Lagrangian multiplier






1 if β · xi >µ
0 if β · xi <µ
.
Here µ must be chosen in such a way that constraint (ii) holds with equality.14
13In what follows, we take it that the vectors of coeﬃcients, β and γ, are known to the college and enter as
parameters in its calculation of an optimal admissions policy. In our simulation exercises, we use data on matriculates
at several institutions to estimate these coeﬃcients, and then use these estimates to assess what optimal admissions
policies might look like at these institutions.
14If β · xi = µ, then A
∗
i might need to lie strictly between zero and one for the capacity constraint to hold with
equality.
11Under the CS regime, there will be separate thresholds for the racial groups. So, for a pair of






1 if β · xi >µ Ri
0 if β · xi <µ Ri
.
Here the µ1 and µ2 are to be chosen such that selection rates for the two groups are consistent with
the capacity and representation constraints holding as equalities.
Under the CB regime, a Lagrangian multiplier on constraint (iii) alters the admissions policy
relative to LF, because non-racial traits are now to be valued both for their association with
prospective academic performance, and for their ability to predict an applicant’s race. Thus, the






1 if [β + θγ] · xi >µ 0
0 if [β + θγ] · xi <µ 0
,
where µ0 and θ are such that both constraints (ii) and (iii) above hold as equalities.
This formalization captures nicely the ideas about color-blind policy mentioned in the intro-
duction. Let j and k be two traits (high school grades and test scores, e.g.). Under LF and CS
regimes, the college’s “marginal rate of substitution” between traits j and k as reﬂected in the
admissions policy function, denoted by MRSj,k, is equal to the relative importance of these traits





whereas, under the CB regime, the rate of substitution between traits j and k that holds constant





These substitution rates are the signals sent out to applicants about the relative value of various
traits in the admissions process. To the extent that the magnitude (and even the sign!) of such
substitution rates is altered when color-blind means are used to pursue color-conscious ends, the
incentives applicants have to acquire the relevant traits might be badly misaligned. In what follows
we use data on student characteristics at selective public and private colleges and universities in
the US to examine how color-blind aﬃrmative action might be expected to play out in practice.
123 Simulating the Impact of Color-Blind Policies
We turn now to an application of the foregoing analysis in the context of college admissions in the
US, using actual student proﬁles from the matriculating classes (entering college in 1989) of seven
selective institutions (three research universities and four liberal arts colleges, labeled “College A”
through “College G” in what follows). We conduct hypothetical admissions experiments, supposing
that the colleges in question would have had to admit only half as many students as were, in fact,
admitted. Their imagined selection problem is to choose which half of the students to retain from
among the actual matriculates. The aﬃrmative action goal is to maintain the original proportion
of black students in this reduced class.15 We estimate the loss of eﬃciency in selection that results
from the imposition of the requirement to be color-blind in the selection process, given this racial
representation goal. We also look at the nature of the constrained-optimal color-blind policies that
emerge.
In this exercise, we compare the performance of our three policy regimes: LF (Laissez-faire); CS
(color-sighted); and CB (color-blind aﬃrmative action.) The capacity constraint for the colleges
in these simulations is c =0 .5.T h e a ﬃrmative action representation target under CS and CB
varies from college to college, as in each case the admissions policy maker seeks to maintain the
same percentage of blacks among the selected students as had obtained in the original class. We
employ the framework just discussed, modelling the constrained policy choices in each regime as
linear optimization problems: The policy maker chooses an admissions policy, given the distribution
of applicant traits and subject to capacity and representation constraints, so as to maximize the
anticipated average academic quality of the admitted class. Once solutions for these linear programs
are in hand for each college, we can compare the performance of the best admissions policy under
each of the three regimes, and take note of how the constrained optimal color-blind policy attains
its goal through an artful choice of racial proxies.
B. The Data
15While we focus here (for illustrative purposes) on the representation of black students, the color-blind methods
we are discussing could be applied to promote (or restrain!) the presence of any identiﬁable subgroup of a student
population. Table 6 below shows the impact on admission rates for Hispanics and Asians of color-blind aﬃrmative
action policies designed to foster the presence of blacks.
13The College and Beyond database contains student level administrative data on college perfor-
mance as well as information on admissions and transcript records of 93,660 full-time students who
entered thirty four colleges and universities in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989. For the purposes
of this paper, we restrict our attention to students from seven institutions in 1989. Our selec-
tion criterion is based solely on the availability of relevant data. Section 6 (the data appendix)
describes how we combined and recoded some of the College and Beyond variables we use in our
analysis. We employed three academic variables: SAT math score, SAT verbal score and High
School Rank; and three socioeconomic background variables: mothers education, fathers education
and the median household income of each student’s zip code.16 We use a simple regression analysis
to associate these variables with the expected class rank after four years of matriculation achieved
by the students in the sample (whose grade histories were available from the administrative records
of the participating institutions). We also use these variables in a linear probability speciﬁcation
to estimate the conditional likelihood that a given student is black, given his or her non-racial
characteristics.17
C. Results
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics for our sample for all students and for black students,
respectively, broken down by institution. Black students score over one standard deviation below
white students on the math and verbal sections of the SAT and have (on average) lower percentile
ranks in high school, which is consistent with previous research. Among the socioeconomic vari-
ables, black students live in lower income zip codes and have parents who are less likely to be
college educated. Table 3 reports results from the college-speciﬁc regression equations, which used
academic and socioeconomic background variables to predict a student’s class rank after four years
of matriculation. Interestingly, both a student’s SAT verbal score and their high school rank are
16Unfortunately, at some colleges family income information was only available for those students who applied for
ﬁnancial aid. So, we have used the median household income in the zip code of residence at the time of application
as a proxy for socioeconomic status.
17Note that, while the estimated parameters β and γ are intended to apply to a college’s applicant pool, the data
on which our estimates are based come from matriculates, not applicants, at the various colleges. As a consequence,
the coeﬃcient estimates presented here could be seriously aﬀected by problems of selection bias. However, because our
goal with these simulation exercises is to assess the comparative short-run eﬃciency of color-blind and color-sighted
policies, the conclusions we reach in this regard should be of interest despite this econometric diﬃculty.
14stronger predictors of college rank upon graduation than is his or her SAT math score. Parental ed-
ucation is also a strong predictor of college rank. After controlling for our three academic variables
and parental education, the average income of a student’s zip code is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4 reports results from the auxiliary regressions that we imagine the colleges to have run
if, when operating under a color-blindness constraint, they needed to use academic and social
background variables to forecast the likelihood that a student is black.
Tables 5 through 7 report the results of greatest interest, regarding the relative ineﬃciency of
race neutral alternatives (T.5), the implication of such policies for the representation of Hispanics
and Asians as well as Blacks (T.6), and the way that optimal color-blind aﬃrmative action alters
the weight given to various factors in the optimal admissions formula — i.e., test scores, grades and
socioeconomic background measures (T.7)18.
We measure the performance of a policy in terms of the average of the class rank predicted for
the admitted students. Table 5 reports our estimates of the performance of CB and CS aﬃrmative
action policies at each college, relative to performance under Laissez-faire (which is normalized
to be 100.) In addition, for comparison purposes the ﬁrst two columns in the Table show the
relative performance of LF policies when colleges are artiﬁcially prohibited from using information
on SAT scores and high school grades, respectively. (Comparing these two columns, we note that
SAT scores appear to be more valuable than high school grades for predicting post-admissions
college performance in this sample, since prohibiting the use of test scores information reduces
the performance of the LF policies by much more than does forbidding the use of grades.) The
third and fourth columns in Table 5 report the relative performance of CS and CB admissions
policies. As the theory predicts, in every case color-blind policies perform less well than do color-
sighted policies. Moreover, the loss of selection eﬃciency associated with the use of color-blindness
(relative to color-sighted policies intended to achieve the same representation target) is generally
comparable to, and often exceeds, the loss of eﬃciency under a LF regime that arises when colleges
are forbidden from using information on students’ grades or test scores.
Table 6 shows the consequence of our three policy regimes (where the focus is on blacks) for
18The LF and CS optimal admissions policies both use the same weights (those derived from the regression
predicting college class rank), while the CB policy employs weights that are “biased” in order to exploit the fact that
some variables are more closely correlated (positively or negatively) than are others with a student’s being black.
15the overall ethnic/racial composition of the admitted class. Table 7 reports our calculations of
the weights on students’ characteristics in the admission formula that are employed under optimal
LF-CS and CB policies. In eﬀect, colleges are assigning a score to each student, and admitting that
half of the applicant pool with higher scores. The numbers in Table 7 are simply the coeﬃcients
used in a linear formula to derive a student’s score from that student’s academic and socioeconomic
traits. (LF and CS regimes use a common formula.) It is clear from the illustrative empirical results
reported in Table 7 that optimal CB admissions policy gives less weight to test scores, more weight
to high school grades, and more weight to social background factors than does optimal policy under
the LF-CS regimes. As such, it is not surprising that CB admissions policy targeted on blacks tends
also to raise admissions rates for Hispanics while lowering them for whites and Asians, as Table 6
reveals.
Our analysis of the data from these selective colleges and universities dramatically illustrates
our principle ﬁnding: If an admissions oﬃce attempts to devise a system for achieving a desired
degree of racial diversity while avoiding the explicit consideration of race, it would be signiﬁcantly
less eﬀective at selecting students of all races who are anticipated to be high academic performers.
The short-run eﬃciency losses (relative to Laissez-faire) from using race-neutral policies to pursue
race-conscious goals are four to ﬁve times greater than the losses incurred when the same goals are
pursued via explicitly race-sighted policies.
4A M o d e l o f I n c e n t i v e E ﬀects with Endogenous Traits
As noted above, there are good reasons to expect that, because they distort applicants’ incentives to
acquire traits valued by selectors, color-blind policies may undermine the eﬃciency of the selection
process over the longer run as well. Unfortunately, with the data at hand it is not possible for us to
investigate empirically the potential magnitude of these long-run eﬀects. However, by formulating
a rigorous theoretical model of the selection problem with endogenous traits, we can gain some
insight into the main issues.
Accordingly, consider the following simple model of competition for scarce positions, which
builds on the framework used in the previous sections. A continuum of applicants (students) of
unit mass consists of two racial groups, R ∈ {1,2}, where λ ∈ (0,1) is the proportion belonging to
16group 1. We will think of group 1 as “advantaged” relative group 2. Applicants seek to be accepted
by any one of a large but ﬁnite number, N,o fi d e n t i c a lﬁrms (colleges). Each applicant is randomly
assigned to a ﬁrm, and so each ﬁrm faces an applicant pool of measure 1/N that is the statistical
replica of the overall population. Let ω>0 be the gross value to an applicant of being accepted.
Each ﬁrm can accept at most the fraction c ∈ (0,1) of those who apply. Firms prefer to accept the
better-qualiﬁed applicants, and take the distribution of characteristics in their applicant pools as
given, independent of their acceptance policies.
Prior to being assigned, applicants make an ex ante binary eﬀort decision e ∈ {0,1} that aﬀects
their qualiﬁcations ex post. The incentive eﬀects of aﬃrmative action will be reﬂected in this model
by the way that alternative policies alter the distribution in the student population of this binary
eﬀort variable, and the resulting distribution of qualiﬁcations. We assume that low eﬀort (e =0 )i s
costless, but high eﬀort (e =1 ) entails a cost, k ≥ 0, for an applicant. The frequency distribution
of eﬀort cost diﬀers between racial groups. Group 2 is “disadvantaged” in the sense that it has a
uniformly less favorable cost distribution than group 1. Let GR(k) be the fraction of group R with
eﬀort cost less than or equal to k ,a n dl e tgR(k) be the associated density function. Further, let
G(k)=λG1(k)+ (1−λ)G2(k) be the CDF of eﬀo r tc o s tf o rt h eo v e r a l lp o p u l a t i o n ,w i t hg(k) being
the associated population density function. The assumption that group 2 is “disadvantaged” can
then be expressed as follows:
Assumption 1 :[ g1(c)/g2(c)] is a monotonically decreasing function of c.
In this model, an applicant’s qualiﬁcation (as perceived and valued by ﬁrms) will be a stochastic
function of eﬀort.19 Let t be a number representing an applicant’s qualiﬁcation, let Fe (t) be the
probability that eﬀort e leads to a level of qualiﬁcation less than or equal to t,a n dl e tfe(t) be the
associated density function. High eﬀort is assumed to increase an applicant’s qualiﬁcation in the
19We emphasize that no asymmetry of information between ﬁrms and applicants is being assumed here. Qualiﬁ-
cations are perfectly and costlessly observable by ﬁrms. Our assumption is that, when an applicant chooses eﬀort ex
ante, the extent of qualiﬁcation that results ex post is random at the individual level. Because there is a continuum
of applicants, the distribution of qualiﬁcations in any population is a function of the fraction of applicants in that
population who choose high eﬀort. Firms care only about an applicant’s ex post qualiﬁcations, and not about the
eﬀort taken ex ante.
17following sense:
Assumption 2 :[ f1(t)/f0(t)] is a monotonically increasing function of t.
Finally, let πR represent the fraction of applicants in group R who choose action e =1( R =1 ,2),
with π being the fraction of all applicants who exert high eﬀort. The variables πR are endogenous,
and will depend on incentives for applicants to take high eﬀort created by the ﬁrms’ acceptance
policies. Obviously,
π = λπ1 +( 1− λ)π2.
In a population where the fraction π exert high eﬀort, the CDF of the distribution of qualiﬁcations
is denoted F(π,t), where
F(π,t)=πF1(t)+( 1− π)F0(t).
Let f(π,t) denote the associated density function.
A. Firm Behavior
An applicant is characterized here by the pair (R,t), which speciﬁes his or her group mem-
bership and degree of qualiﬁcation. So, a ﬁrm’s acceptance policy must be some function A(R,t),
representing the probability that an applicant with characteristics (R,t) is accepted.
Deﬁnition 1 A ﬁrm’s policy is color-blind if A(1,t)=A(2,t) for almost every t.
As before, in this theoretical discussion we consider the behavior of ﬁrms under three possible
policy regimes: Laissez-faire, color-sighted and color-blind aﬃrmative action (LF, CS, and CB,
respectively). Moreover, in each case we study a decentralized situation where ﬁrms take πR,t h e
proportion of high eﬀort applicants in each racial group, as given when deciding upon an acceptance
policy.
Under LF, ﬁrms are unconcerned with diversity so they ignore group identity information. Thus,






Trivially, the solution to this problem is given by: {A∗(t)=1 ,t≥ t∗and A∗(t)=0 ,t<t ∗}, where
F(π,t∗)=1 −c. The best LF policy is a color-blind threshold policy, where ﬁrms accept the fraction
c of the applicant pool with the highest qualiﬁcations.
18Let r∗
2 be the acceptance rate for group 2 that obtains under this LF optimal policy. We model
aﬃrmative action (either the color-blind or the color-sighted variety) by positing that ﬁrms seek
an acceptance rate for group 2 members, r2, that exceeds the “natural”rate, r∗
2, but is no greater
than that implied by population parity. Thus:
r∗
2 <r 2 ≤ c.
Given their beliefs about the fraction in each group of applicants who have chosen e =1 , we require
ﬁrms to choose an acceptance policy under which they anticipate to accept group 2 applicants at
the rate, r2. The aggressiveness of the aﬃrmative action policy pursued by ﬁrms is taken to be
exogenous throughout this analysis. In light of the capacity constraint, and given this two-group
set-up, a representation target for group 2, r2, necessarily implies a target for group 1, r1,w h e r e :
λr1 +( 1− λ)r2 = c.
Consider now a ﬁrm’s selection problem under a CS policy regime, with representation target





A(R,t)f(πR,t)dt = rR,R ∈ {1,2}.
Here the problem is solved separately for each group. As before, it is clear that the solution to
this problem involves {A∗(R,t)=1 ,t≥ t∗
R and A∗(R,t)=0 ,t<t ∗
R}, where F(πR,t ∗
R)=1− rR,
R =1 ,2. Thus, under color-sighted aﬃrmative action ﬁrms follow distinct threshold policies for
each group, accepting the fraction rR of the group R applicant pool with the highest qualiﬁcations,
R =1 ,2.
Lastly, consider the ﬁrms’ behavior in the CB regime, with the representation target for group
2g i v e na sr2 <c . Firms again take (π1,π2) as given, but now must choose a color-blind acceptance
policy function so as to maximize mean qualiﬁcations of those accepted, while anticipating to
generate the desired representation of group 2 members. So, the problem for ﬁrms becomes choosing





A(t)f(πR,t)dt = rR,R=1 ,2













Thus, ξ(π1,π2,t) is the conditional probability that an applicant belongs to the group 2, given
group speciﬁch i g he ﬀort rates (π1,π2), and given that the applicant’s level of qualiﬁcation is
t. This problem is a linear program in an inﬁnite dimensional space, as both the objective and
the constraints may be regarded as linear functionals of the inﬁnite dimensional control variable,
{A(t):t ∈ [0,1]}. Such programs are studied extensively in Anderson and Nash (1987), though we
will see momentarily that we need not solve this problem explicitly to characterize the equilibrium
distribution of applicant qualiﬁcations under a CB policy regime in this model.
Let µ0 be the multiplier on the capacity constraint and let θ be the multiplier on the represen-
tation constraint in the ﬁrm’s CB optimization problem stated above. Then, by the inﬁnite dimen-
sional analogue of the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, the solution to this problem is given by: {A∗(t)=1 ,
t + θξ(π1,π2,t) ≥ µ0;a n dA∗(t)=0 ,t+ θξ(π1,π2,t) <µ 0} Thus, an optimal acceptance policy
function has the so-called “bang-bang” property. That is, for almost every t,e i t h e rA∗(t)=1 ,o r
A∗(t)=0 . It is also clear that, since r∗
2 <r 2, this optimal policy under color-blind aﬃrmative action
cannot be a threshold policy. Hence, we may conclude that there will be levels of qualiﬁcation t and
s,w i t ht<s , such that A∗(t)=1and A∗(s)=0 . That is, imposing the color-blind constraint on
ﬁrms that remain intent on achieving more representation for the disadvantaged group than occurs
under Laissez-faire must lead to a situation in which some applicants are accepted while others with
higher qualiﬁcations are rejected, thereby undercutting applicants’ incentives to exert high eﬀort.
This is a general feature of color-blind aﬃrmative action policies, and it is the basic reason that
such policies must be ineﬃcient over the longer run, relative to the color-sighted alternative.20
20This bang-bang property would not hold if, in the manner of Chan and Eyster (2003), we were to impose
some kind of monotonicity constraint on ﬁrms [e.g., requiring that A(t) be non-decreasing, out of the incentive
compatibility concern that applicants not see any gain from under-reporting their qualiﬁcations.] Still, the basic
point we are making here would remain valid, even were we to impose monotonicity. Under such a constraint, the
ﬁrm’s problem can be reformulated so that it becomes (the dual of) what Anderson and Nash (1987, section 4.4) call
a continuous semi-inﬁnite linear program. If we apply their Theorem 4.8 (page 76) to this reformulated problem, we
20Observe that any color-blind acceptance policy function, A(t),d e ﬁnes two numbers: Ae =
{
Z
A(t)fe(t)dt},e∈ {0,1}. Ae is the probability that an applicant who exerts eﬀort e is accepted,
and ω[A1 − A0] is the expected beneﬁt to an applicant from choosing action e =1instead of
e =0 . So, all acceptance policies that generate a common value for [A0−A1] must induce the same
behavioral response from applicants. Now, given that a ﬁrm’s representation target for group 2 is
r2, and given that its capacity implies c = λr1 +( 1− λ)r2, it follows that the ﬁrm’s constraints
under a CB policy regime can be written as follows:
πRA1 +( 1− πR)A0 = rR,R =1 ,2.
From these equations it follows that (A1 − A0)=
[c−r2]
[λ(π1−π2)]. Thus, under color-blindness, the
assumption that workers face a binary eﬀort choice implies that any feasible acceptance policy by
ﬁrms engenders the same incentives for applicant eﬀort, regardless of whether that policy is optimal.
This observation greatly simpliﬁes the task of ﬁnding equilibrium under color-blind aﬃrmative
action in this model.
B. Applicant Behavior
Regardless of the regulatory regime, an applicant with exogenous characteristics (R,k) who
anticipates ﬁrms to employ the acceptance policy A(R,t) will behave in accordance with the eﬀort
supply function, e∗(R,k), given as follows:
e∗(R,k)=1 if ω
Z
[A(R,t)[f1(t) − f0(t)]dt] ≥ k,otherwise e∗(R,k)=0 .
That is, applicants choose to exert high eﬀort if and only if their eﬀort costs are below some
threshold. Therefore, anticipating the acceptance policy function, A(R,t), the proportion of group
can conclude that with a monotonicity constraint the ﬁrm’s optimal acceptance policy can be expressed as a step
function with at most two points of discontinuity. This, in turn, implies that there will be levels of qualiﬁcation t and
s,w i t ht<s ,s u c ht h a tA
∗(t) > 0 and A
∗(s) < 1. That is, some applicants are accepted with a probability strictly
greater than zero, while others with higher qualiﬁcations are accepted with a probability strictly less than one, again
undercutting applicants’ incentives to exert high eﬀort.
But, the main point we wish to emphasize is that, once applicants’ qualiﬁcations are allowed to be endogenous in
the manner that we follow here, the imposition of such a monotonicity constraint on the ﬁrm’s acceptance policy is
irrelevant for determining the distribution of qualiﬁcations in equilibrium. This is because (as we show below,) given
the capacity and representation constraints, all feasible color-blind aﬃrmative action policies for ﬁrms generate the
same (diminished) eﬀort incentives for applicants.




A(R,t)[f1(t) − f0(t)]dt),R=1 ,2
C. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is an acceptance policy for ﬁrms, A∗(R,t),a n da ne ﬀort supply
function for applicants, e∗(R,k), that are mutual best responses to one another. We are now in
a position to describe equilibrium behavior by applicants and ﬁrms under the three regulatory
regimes. We require a bit more notation. Given a qualiﬁcation threshold t and an acceptance
capacity c,s u c ht h a tF−1
0 (1 − c) ≤ t ≤ F−1
1 (1 − c),d e ﬁne b π(t,c) as the solution to the equation:
F(π,t)=1−c.T h a ti s ,b π(t,c) is the proportion of an applicant population facing the qualiﬁcation
threshold, t, that would need to choose high eﬀort if the acceptance rate in that population to just
equal c. Obviously,
b π(t,c)=[ F0(t) − (1 − c)]/[F0(t) − F1(t)]
Moreover, let ∆F(t)=[ F0(t) − F1(t)], ∆G(k)=[ G1(k) − G2(k)], and deﬁne the function: δ(r2)=
ω(c − r2)/λ. Finally, let π∗
R be in fraction of group R who exert high eﬀort equilibrium, and let
t∗
R be the qualiﬁcation threshold that applies to group R in equilibrium (relevant only when ﬁrms
employ a threshold policy.) It is straightforward to verify the following proposition.
22Proposition 1 Equilibrium may be determined as follows:
(a) LF equilibrium is given by group-speciﬁch i g he ﬀort rates (π∗
1,π∗
2) and an acceptance threshold
t∗ such that:
b π(t∗,c)=G(ω∆F(t∗)),a n dπ∗
R = GR(ω∆F(t∗)),R=1 ,2,
where ﬁrms’ acceptance policy is A∗(R,t)=1 ,t≥ t∗,a n dA∗(R,t)=0 , t<t ∗, and applicants’
eﬀort supply function is e∗(R,k)=1 ,k≤ ω∆F(t∗),a n de∗(R,k)=0 ,k>ω ∆F(t∗).










Firms follow the CS threshold policy A∗(R,t)=1 ,t≥ t∗
R,a n dA∗(R,t)=0 , t<t ∗
R, and applicants
follow the eﬀort supply function e∗(R,k)=1 ,k≤ ω∆F(t∗
R),a n de∗(R,k)=0 ,k>ω ∆F(t∗
R),
R =1 ,2.
(c) CB equilibrium entails ﬁrms choosing some feasible acceptance policy and applicants choos-
ing: e∗(R,k)=1if and only if k ≤ k∗,e l s ee∗(R,k)=0 ,w h e r ek∗ solves ∆G(k∗)=δ(r2)/k∗
Proof. The claims (a) and (b) are a transparent consequence of the deﬁnition of equilibrium.
Concerning (c), as noted above, capacity and representation constraints require that applicants
face the eﬀort incentive:
ω(A1 − A0)=ω[c − r2]/[λ(π1 − π2)]
while optimal behavior by applicants implies that:
π1 − π2 = ∆G(ω(A1 − A0))
Combining these two equations to eliminate (A1 − A0),a n di d e n t i f y i n gk∗ in (c) above with the
value in equilibrium of ω(A1 − A0) yields the stated result.
D .T h eI m p a c to fA f f i r m a t i v eA c t i o no nA p plicant Qualifications in Equilibrium
Let us now consider how the pursuit by ﬁrms of greater representation of the disadvantaged
aﬀects the equilibrium distribution of the qualiﬁcations presented by applicants in the two groups.
23We adopt the following notation: given ﬁrms’ acceptance capacity, c,l e tr∗
2(c) denote the proportion
of group 2 applicants who are accepted in Laissez-faire equilibrium. Thus,
r∗
2(c)=1− F(G2[∆F(t∗)],t ∗),where t∗ solves b π(t∗,c)=G(ω∆F(t∗)).
We consider the impact of “weak” (that is, r2 “close to” r∗
2(c)) and “strong” (that is, r2 “close
to” c) aﬃrmative action goals. We wish to distinguish two cases under which the marginally
accepted applicant in the absence of any kind of aﬃrmative action has either a low or a high level
of qualiﬁcations. Speciﬁcally, let t0 solve the equation: f1(t0)/f0(t0)=1 . If in LF equilibrium
t∗ <t 0 we say that ﬁrms’ equilibrium acceptance standards are “loose” (because the marginally
accepted applicant has low qualiﬁcations), while if t∗ >t 0 we say ﬁrms’ acceptance standards are
“tight”(because the marginally accepted applicant has high qualiﬁcations). Examination of Figure
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Figure 2: Laissez-faire (A) and Color-Blind (B) Equilibrium
Proposition 2 If standards are loose in Laissez—faire equilibrium, then the pursuit of suﬃciently
weak CS aﬃrmative action goals leads to an increase in qualiﬁcations among the advantaged group
and a decrease in qualiﬁcations among the disadvantaged group, widening the racial qualiﬁcations
gap relative to Laissez—faire. Moreover, tight standards in Laissez—faire equilibrium imply that weak
24CS aﬃrmative action decreases qualiﬁcations among the advantaged, and increases qualiﬁcations
among the disadvantaged, thereby narrowing the racial qualiﬁcations gap. When Laissez—faire equi-
librium standards are close to the margin between being loose or tight then suﬃciently strong CS
aﬃrmative action goals must decrease the qualiﬁcations of both groups.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of color-blind aﬃrmative action on applicant qualiﬁcations in equi-
librium. To do so, we need one last deﬁnition. We will say that a selection problem is characterized
by “elitism” if there is no acceptance policy by ﬁrms that can induce “high cost” applicants to
exert high eﬀort. (Here an applicant is said to have “high cost” if k>k 0,w h e r ek0 solves the
equation: g1(k0)/g2(k0)=1 .) That is, elitism obtains when the structure of the situation is such
that ω∆F(t0) <k 0. (Note that eﬀort incentives are maximal at the acceptance threshold t = t0,
and that group disparity of qualiﬁcations is greatest when the marginal applicant to choose e∗ =1
has cost just equal to k0). Figure 3, together with Proposition 1(c), can be used to establish the
following result:
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Figure 3: Color-Blind Aﬃrmative Action Under Elitism, δ∗ >δ
Proposition 3 Suppose the condition of elitism obtains. Then for every aﬃrmative action goal
25r2,w i t hr∗
2(c) <r 2 <c , there is a unique color-blind aﬃrmative action equilibrium. Moreover, as
r2 rises, the level of qualiﬁcations in both groups declines, as does the qualiﬁcations gap between the
groups. In the limit, as r2 approaches c (population parity as a goal), the proportion of applicants
choosing high eﬀort in the color-blind aﬃrmative action equilibrium approaches zero. However,
there does not exist an equilibrium in this model under color-blind aﬃrmative action that implements
the representation target of population proportionality, r2 = c.
This is a stark result that warrants further emphasis.21 Consider an extreme example: one
way to achieve population proportionality for all groups is to select from among candidates for a
limited number of positions at random, with every applicant facing the same chance of success. This
assures (with large numbers of applicants and statistical independence of applicant traits) that the
fraction of successful candidates from any group equals the fraction of applicants from that group.
Yet, random selection gives applicants no incentive to acquire traits valued by the selector. In
equilibrium, the population of applicants (from all groups) will be much less distinguished under
random selection, despite the fact that those selected will indeed be racially diverse. Proposition 3
demonstrates that the intuition of this extreme example extends to the general case.22
In light of Figure 3, all of the claims in Proposition 3 are straightforward, except the last on
the impossibility of implementing an aﬃrmative action goal of population parity in a color-blind
fashion. Here is a demonstration of this result: We know that, as the r2 approaches c, applicants’
incentive to exert high eﬀort vanishes. This leads to a non-existence result when r2 = c because, if
all workers take eﬀort e =0 , then the distributions of qualiﬁcations presented by workers in both
groups in equilibrium would have to be identical. But then, no representation constraint would
need to be imposed on ﬁrms to generate population parity. Yet, absent such a constraint, ﬁrms
would want to behave as they do under Laissez Faire, accepting the fraction c of workers with the
21We have further results along these lines in a more general setting. See Fryer and Loury (2003), which con-
siders the problem of equilibrium and optimal handicapping (i.e., aﬃrmative action or, more generally, “categorical
redistribution”) in winner-take-all markets.
22There is an interesting externality here that promotes long run ineﬃciencies. Individual selectors drawing on a
large, common pool of prospective applicants, may not take into account that their choice of selection criteria alters
the distribution of traits in the overall applicant population. This makes the adoption of a random selection method
look like a low cost move for any given selector. But when all selectors make this choice, they are all worse-oﬀ than
t h e yw o u l db ei fn o n eo ft h e mm a d ei t .
26highest qualiﬁcations. Yet, were ﬁrms to do this, lower cost workers in both groups would then
have an incentive to choose exert high eﬀort, and the fact that group 2 is disadvantaged relative to
group 1 would imply a failure to reach population parity in equilibrium. We conclude that when
one group is disadvantaged relative to the other there can exist no color-blind equilibrium achieving
population parity!
5M o v i n g B e y o n d R a c e
Our principle theoretical conclusion is that color-blind aﬃrmative action entails a basic trade-
oﬀ between incentives and representational goals. If ﬁrms are constrained to be color-blind but
continue to value diversity, they will act in such a way as to “ﬂatten” the function that relates
a worker’s probability of being accepted (in equilibrium) to that worker’s level of qualiﬁcation:
Some lower qualiﬁcation workers must have a greater chance of being accepted under color-blind
aﬃrmative action, and some higher qualiﬁcation workers must have a smaller chance. (Otherwise,
the disadvantaged group, which has relatively more low qualiﬁcation members, cannot have its
representation increased.) This ﬂattening of the link between qualiﬁcations and success undercuts
incentives for all workers to exert preparatory eﬀort.
The issues explored in this paper are of more general interest, beyond the study of racial equity.
There are many context in which a ﬁrm or public authority distributes some resource across a
heterogeneous, categorically diverse population, with the dual objectives of allocating that resource
to the most productive members of the population while avoiding an undue categorical disparity in
receipt of the beneﬁt.23 A state government may need to distribute funds for public works among
competing cities and towns, aiming to allocate the funds where they are most needed (or can best
be made use of), while limiting any resulting disparity amongst jurisdictions. Similarly, a supplier
of consumer credit (or insurance) may need to screen applicants according to creditworthiness (or
insurability), without thereby generating a customer base with “too few” racial minorities. When
the observable individual traits that are positively associated with creditworthiness (or insurability)
are less frequently present in one population group than another, then simply screening-out the
least qualiﬁed applicants could lead to a stark disparity in rates of selection between groups. For
23Akerlof (1978) investigates a related problem of “tagging” in the context of optimal taxation and welfare pro-
grams.
27political, economic or legal reasons, such an outcome might be undesirable. However, it may also
be undesirable in such settings to explicitly discriminate among applicants based on (race or sex-
deﬁned) group identities. This situation leads to the posing of an analytical problem nearly identical
to the one investigated in this paper.
Alternatively, consider a customs union — e.g., the European Common Market. Imagine that
a member state wants to favor its domestic producers of some good, but cannot do so directly
without violating the trade agreement. Imagine further that members of the customs union are
permitted to impose quality standards regulations which all goods, no matter where they originate,
must meet. For instance, some Germans may want to limit imports into their country of Dutch
beer, but may be forbidden to bar such products by Common Market rules. Still, they can require
of any beer sold in Germany that it have so much hops, so little preservative, come in kegs that
are made of a particular wood, etc.24
More generally, let the country have some preferences about what its quality standards should
be, and suppose that the relative costs to domestic and foreign producers of meeting diﬀerent
standards are known. Suppose quality has two dimensions and that, compared to foreign producers,
domestic ﬁrms are at an absolute cost disadvantage when forced to produce the Laissez-faire optimal
quality vector. So, domestic producers would get a relatively low market share under the Laissez-
faire optimal (i.e., disinterested) quality regulations. However, suppose domestic ﬁrms have a
comparative cost advantage over foreigners in satisfying one dimension of quality. Then, by biasing
regulation so as to give greater importance to that dimension of quality, the country in question
can raise its domestic ﬁrms’ market share without appearing to practice protectionism, but at the
expense of having a less than optimal (given their natural preferences for quality) set of regulations.
Again, we have arrived at a formulation analogous to the model studied here.
24Indeed, there is a real case involving Beck (German) and Heineken (Dutch) beers, in which the European Court
of Justice prohibited Germany from enforcing its purity requirements for beer against beverages imported from other
members of the EC. (See Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, Case 178/84,
Judgment of 12 March 1987, 1987 ECR 1227.) We are grateful to William James Adams for bringing this example
to our attention.
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306D a t a A p p e n d i x
The College and Beyond data base contains admissions and transcript records of 93,660 full-time
students who entered thirty four colleges and universities in the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989. For
the purposes of this paper, we restrict our attention to students from seven institutions in 1989.
Our selection criterion is based solely on the availability of relevant data. All of our regressions
include dummies for missing data. We describe below how we combined and recoded the variables
used in our analysis.
1. SAT Math: Results of each student’s performance on the mathematics portion of the Scholas-
tic Aptitude Tests (SAT). The institutions reported each student’s SAT scored. Only one
SAT math score and one SAT verbal score was recorded for each student, even if the student
took the test multiple times. Information is not available pertaining to which SAT score the
institution reported.
2. SAT Verbal: Results of each student’s performance on the verbal portion of the Scholastic
Aptitude Tests.
3. High School Percentile: This captures the percentile rank of each student in their high school.
4. Parental Education: Parental education information was drawn from the student’s college
application. Questions involving parental education varied greatly from university to univer-
sity. To account for this, we aggregated the data into two categories: college degree holder
or not. This was done, independently, for mother’s and father’s education.
5. Zip Income: Student’s residential Zip Code is drawn from College and Beyond dataset. We
get median household income by zip code from 1990 Census.








ZIP Income # of students
             
College A  699  644  96  0.76  0.88  49780  1139 
 (66) (73)  (6)  (0.43)  (0.33)  (20480)   
College B  649  578  93  0.64  0.77  44149  1858 
 (80) (76)  (10)  (0.48)  (0.42)  (18317)   
College C  599  552  82  0.69  0.83  41256  1486 
 (86) (84)  (16)  (0.46)  (0.38)  (20839)   
College D  626  600  88  0.75  0.82  41772  829 
 (91) (94)  (11)  (0.43)  (0.38)  (16940)   
College E  595  580  90  0.73  0.84  42725  606 
 (74) (82)  (10)  (0.44)  (0.37)  (16966)   
College F  621  588  92  0.67  0.76  45518  582 
 (81) (82)  (9)  (0.47)  (0.43)  (18617)   
College G  682  655  94  0.71  0.79  46566  519 




















ZIP Income  # of black students
             
College A  612  595  95  0.63  0.66  39858  82 
 (65)  (66)  (5)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (20783)   
College B  541  523  84  0.48  0.45  33223  157 
 (82)  (83)  (15)  (0.50) (0.50)  (14568)   
College C  515  502  84  0.68  0.75  26042  98 
 (87)  (100)  (16)  (0.48) (0.44)  (11383)   
College D  486  486  76  0.46  0.41  31792  59 
 (94)  (105)  (18)  (0.50) (0.50)  (14492)   
College E  515  523  84  0.69  0.65  34686  24 
 (73)  (95)  (17)  (0.48) (0.49)  (15744)   
College F  501  491  82  0.45  0.42  32308  49 
 (74)  (72)  (16)  (0.50) (0.50)  (14401)   
College G  563  552  84  0.48  0.55  37812  33 












 Table 3: Predicted College Rank 
 
 






Constant R²  N 
                 
College A  7.67 11.65  7.64  4.38 4.49 0.03  -159.27  0.24 1139 
 (1.28)  (1.15) (1.69) (2.07) (2.73)  (0.41)  (16.89)     
College B  1.33  6.08 7.37 3.71  5.25  1.65  -75.04  0.13 1858 
 (0.88)  (0.92) (0.75) (1.45) (1.69)  (0.36)  (8.50)     
College C  5.69 6.58  6.66  6.64  2.50  0.96 -88.09  0.24 1486 
 (0.87)  (0.88) (0.53) (3.00) (3.63)  (0.34)  (7.33)     
College D  4.05 4.81  4.26  2.59  5.98  0.59  -51.67  0.14 829 
 (1.25)  (1.22) (1.05) (2.54) (2.86)  (0.60)  (10.24)     
College E  0.45  8.25 8.39 5.98  -0.25 -0.58  -74.14  0.19 606 
 (1.53)  (1.36) (1.25) (2.97) (3.59)  (0.77)  (15.08)     
College F  5.70 7.09  8.21  3.37 0.74  -0.11  -103.85  0.17 582 
 (1.57)  (1.52) (1.73) (2.99) (3.34)  (0.67)  (17.36)     
College G  8.87 10.51  8.82  4.25 4.62  0.81  -173.41  0.34 519 
 (1.74)  (1.57) (1.68) (2.61) (2.98)  (0.57)  (16.71)     
 
 
Notes:  College rank is percentiles in distribution of cumulative GPA among students who matriculated at that college in 1989. HS 
Percentile is students' percentile in his high school. Mother and Father’s Education are dummies for students’ mother and father being 
college educated.  Zip Income is the average income of the student’s zip code from the 1990 Census.  Bold coefficients are five 
percent significant. Increments: SAT variables 100 points, HS Percentile 10 percentiles, ZIP Income 10000 dollars. We used dummies 




Table 4:  Probability of Being Black Regression 
 






Constant R²  N 
                  
College A  -12.31  -1.88 1.80  3.19  -7.81  -0.36  94.80  0.22 1139 
 (1.16)  (1.00)  (1.53)  (1.88) (2.48)  (0.37)  (15.50)    
College B  -9.46 -2.73 -5.95  0.52  -9.97 -2.02  156.40  0.22 1858 
 (0.81)  (0.84)  (0.68)  (1.32) (1.54)  (0.33)  (7.76)    
College C  -6.42 -3.59  1.32  1.55 -1.41  -1.87 63.83  0.11 1486 
 (0.80)  (0.81)  (0.49)  (2.79) (3.37)  (0.32)  (6.81)    
College D  -6.84 -2.59 -4.49  1.66  -13.78  -0.93  118.36  0.25 829 
 (1.04)  (1.02)  (0.87)  (2.11) (2.38)  (0.50)  (8.51)    
College E  -4.69 -2.36 -1.62 1.28  -3.60  -0.76  65.38  0.07 606 
 (1.11)  (0.98)  (0.90)  (2.15) (2.60)  (0.56)  (10.92)    
College F  -9.00 -7.59 -9.29  2.95  -5.77 -2.49  207.56  0.34 582 
 (1.35)  (1.30)  (1.48)  (2.55) (2.85)  (0.58)  (15.13)    
College G  -10.27 -4.21  -6.45  -0.83 -2.57  -0.35  169.63  0.24 519 
 (1.58)  (1.43)  (1.53)  (2.36) (2.70)  (0.52)  (15.17)    
 
Notes: Dependent variable is student's probability of being black times 100. HS Percentile is students' percentile in his high school. 
Mother and Father’s Education are dummies for students mother and father being College Educated.  Zip Income is the average 
income of the student’s zip code from the 1990 Census.  Bold coefficients are five percent significant. Increments: SAT variables 100 
points, HS Percentile 10 percentiles, ZIP Income 10000 dollars. We used dummies for the missing data. (Coefficients for these 






Table 5: Relative Performance of Color-Blind and Color-Sighted Policies 
 
 
 Relative  Performances:     
 Laissez-Faire  w/o  SAT Laissez-Faire 
w/o HS Percentile 
Color-Sighted Color-Blind 
       
College A  92.23  99.50  98.85  94.23 
College B  97.97  97.73  98.92  93.78 
College C  96.40  95.80  99.85  98.59 
College D  96.46  99.09  98.66  91.61 
College E  97.04  96.98  99.83  97.72 
College F  95.20  96.66  98.18  92.87 
College G  93.78  99.50  97.80  85.30 
 
Notes:  Predicted College Rank of a student is estimated by the OLS regression. (Regression Results are given in Table 3). For each 
policy, we compute the average predicted College Rank of the admitted class. We call this value, the Performance of the Policy. To 
compute the Relative Performance, we index Laissez Faire's Performance as 100. For example color-sighted Relative 
Performance=(color-sighted Performance *100)/(Laissez-Faire Performance)   
Table 6:  Diversity 
 
 
  Blacks     Hispanics    Asians 


























College  A 5  41  42 7  7  20 83 80  68  474  441  439 
College  B  11  78  74  8  7 13  185 175  126  724 668 714 
College  C 28  49 53 20 17  23  39  38  41  651  635  617 
College D  2  29  29  2  2  8  46  44  42.41  357  332  319.59
College E  6  12  12  2  2  4.33  31  30  30  255  251  249.67
College  F 1  24  27.03 5  4  10 77 72  54  199  182  188.97
College  G  0  16  19  1  1  9  30  27 18 228 215 212 
 
 
Note: This table shows the effects of Laissez-Faire, Color-Sighted and Color-Blind policies on the composition of the admitted class. Note 
that Color-Blind policy is targeted for black students only. The number of students are not integers under Color-Blind policy. This is 
because, the college assigns an admission probability for two students strictly between zero and one. The college has a linear programming 
problem: to maximize a linear function with respect to some linear constraints. The college assigns a value to each student (with respect to 
his expected college rank and probability of being black) and admits the students with higher values. However, on the margin the college is 
indifferent between two students. (two students have equal values). That is why admitting a fraction of these students is consistent with the 





T-6Table 7:  The Weight on Students' Characteristics in the Admission Formula  
for Laissez Faire and Color-Blind Policies. 
 











  LF  CB LF CB  LF CB  LF CB LF CB  LF CB 
College A  7.67  -5.37  11.65  9.66  7.64  9.55  4.38 7.76 4.49 -3.79  0.03 -0.35 
College B  1.33  -4.95  6.08  4.27  7.37  3.42  3.71 4.06 5.25 -1.37  1.65 0.31 
College  C  5.69 1.72  6.58  4.36 6.66  7.48 6.64 7.60 2.50 1.63  0.96 -0.20 
College D  4.05  -1.40  4.81  2.75  4.26  0.68  2.59 3.91 5.98 -5.00  0.59 -0.15 
College E  0.45  -5.43  8.25  5.29  8.39  6.36  5.98  7.59 -0.25 -4.77  -0.58 -1.53 
College F  5.70  -0.17  7.09  2.14  8.21  2.15  3.37 5.29 0.74 -3.02  -0.11  -1.73 
College G  8.87  -5.09  10.51  4.79  8.82  0.05  4.25 3.12 4.62 1.13  0.81 0.33 
 
Notes: Increments: SAT variables, 100 points; HS Percentiles, 10 percentiles; ZIP Income, 10000 dollars. 
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